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INTRODUCTION
AND
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The cross appeal presents the narrow legal question of
whether a lease which required the tenant to construct a shopping
center, also obligated the tenant to perform necessary repairs in
order to "maintain" such improvements.

Although the Lease

required Manivest to "be responsible for the entire demised
premises" and "during the term of the Lease to maintain the same"
(Ex. 1 115), the trial court ruled that Manivest was obligated to
maintain the land on which the shopping center was built but not
the improvements.

Tr. 190.1

Because of Manivest's numerous other material and persistent
defaults, this did not prevent the trial court from ruling that
the Howes had properly terminated the Lease.

It did, however,

prevent the Howes from introducing a great deal of evidence which

2

The trial court was called upon to decide this issue with
very little notice. Although the court had previously ordered
that all dispositive motions be filed before the trial so that
they could be heard on a Monday (R. 344), Manivest did not serve
its Motion in Limine until after business hours on Monday,
March 5, 1990, the evening before the trial commenced (R. 419).
On the first day of trial, the Howes argued that the Motion
in Limine was untimely, that it could be dispositive of Count Two
of their Complaint, and that it should not be considered until
after all of the evidence had been received and the parties had
adequate time to brief the issue. Tr. 176 1. 24 to 177 1. 8.
Nevertheless the court ordered that the Motion be argued the next
morning, before hearing from the Howe's expert witnesses
regarding the condition of the roof and parking lot. Tr. 180
1. 22 to 181 1. 4.

established that Manivest1s breach of its duty to maintain the
improvements was an independently sufficient reason for
terminating the Lease.2
Manivest1s admissions during trial indicate a course of
performance under the Lease which is inconsistent with the
court's ruling.

Manivest admitted during the trial that the

Lease was an "entirely net lease" (Tr. 316, 1. 1-10); that
substantial repairs were necessary (Id.

at 361-2); and that

Manivest, not the Howes, was responsible for "anything associated
with the operation" of the shopping center.

Jd. at 315, 1. 22-

25; see Ex. 29, 43 and 45. The additional evidence which the
Howes proffered, would have corroborated the meaning of the Lease
and the parties intent.3
Manivest has failed to adequately address the Howe's position that a covenant to "maintain" is an independent covenant to
"repair".

By failing to address this issue and by acknowledging

According to the Restatement, Second, Property (Landlord
and Tenant) (1977) (hereafter, the "Restatement"), where the
lease provides the remedy of forfeiture, the "right to terminate
is widely recognized, for example, for the tenantfs failure to
repair as promised. . ." Jd. Section 13.1, Reporter Note 9.
Augusta Corp. v. Strawn# 174 So.2d 422 (Fla. Ct. App. 1965).
3

The proffered testimony of both Mr. Cowley, the attorney
who represented the tenant, and Mr. Carpenter, the broker who
brought the parties together, related directly to the parties'
intent in 1960 that the maintenance obligation apply to the
structures. Tr. 230-32. The testimony of Mr. Frazier would have
related to the industry standards for maintenance of shopping
center improvements. Tr. 229-30. Such critical testimony was
clearly relevant to the interpretation of the Lease.

-2-

that the Lease was an entirely net lease, Manivest has in effect
admitted that it had a duty under the contract to maintain the
improvements.

Any other interpretation renders illusory and

superfluous the words:

"be responsible for", "maintain", and

"entire demised premises" as used in the Lease.

Manivest's

rebuttal is superficial and inadequate.

I.

THE HOWES GAVE MANIVEST MORE THAN ADEQUATE
NOTICE AND OPPORTUNITY TO CURE.

Manivest asserts that its failure to maintain the
improvements, including the roof and the parking lot, was "not
the subject of any notice or opportunity to cure."
at 23 (emphasis added).

This is not true.

Reply Brief

Manivest ignored

repeated notices and persistently refused to cure the defaults.
The March 1988 letter from the Howes to Manivest --the
Howe's very first communication about the defaults -- did not
simply allege a general violation of paragraph 5 of the Lease.
It specifically addressed the condition of the improvements,
stating:

"the surface of the parking lot is not and for some

period of time has not been in good order or repair."

Ex. 30.

By the end of March 1988, the defaults had already existed
for well over 60 days.4

Nevertheless, after becoming aware of

4

The Valley Bank loan dated from early December of 1987.
Ex. 16, 17 and 18. The weeds had grown the prior year and been
exposed by receding winter snow. Ex. 30. The parking lot had
been in disrepair for several years. Ex. 25, 26 and 28.
-3-

the defaults, the Howe's took reasonable and responsible action.
See Reply Brief at 9, n. 7.

The Howes did not immediately send a

notice of termination or file a lawsuit.

Instead, they wrote the

March 1988 demand letter and specifically advised Manivest of the
problems that were then apparent.

Manivest did nothing to solve

the maintenance problems -- not then, and not even prior to the
time of trial, almost two years later.
After the March 1988 notice, the Howes continued to insist
that the physical condition of the improvements was at issue.

In

April of 1988, the Howes served another strongly worded letter.
Ex. 30. At the end of May, they served the notice of termination.

Ex. 31. As of late July, however, Manivest still had not

dealt with any of the problems.

Ex. 32 (Letter dated July 27,

1988) .
Litigation followed.

In November the Howes filed their

Complaint alleging that Manivest had breached its maintenance
obligation and that the improvements were "in need of substantial
maintenance and repairs."

R. 0002 1122. In June of 1989,

Manivest filed a Motion for Summary Judgment in which it characterized Count Two of the Howe's Complaint as dealing only with
weeds on the property.

R. 102 1I4B.

In their written Response,

the Howes reaffirmed that their concerns also dealt with other
maintenance issues.

R. 210 116.

-4-

During discovery the Howes gave further notice to Manivest.
Initially, the Howes did not have access to, and had not
inspected, the interior of the buildings or the roofs. During
discovery, the Howes attempted to obtain permission from Manivest
and its attorneys to perform an inspection.

R. 356 at ffl8-20;

R. 369flfll-6.The Howes thus continued to assert that the
physical condition of the improvements was at issue.
Manivest still refused either to cure the defaults or to
cooperate, so in January of 1990, the Howes served Manivest with
a Motion to Permit Access.

At that time, the Howes reiterated

that the condition and maintenance of the improvements were at
issue.

R. 250. Certainly this pleading gave further notice, and

Manivest acknowledged as much by finally allowing the Howes and
their expert witnesses to inspect the improvements.

Still,

Manivest did nothing before the trial.
It would be quite another matter if Manivest had seized any
of its numerous opportunities to discharge its maintenance
obligations.

Instead, it refused.

Consequently, at trial, Swen

Mortenson admitted that "major roof work needs to be done" and
that the cost of redoing the parking lot "was approximately
$200,000."

Tr. 361, 1. 7 to 362, 1. 2.5

5

When asked why the

Mr. Hawkes would have testified that the roof had outlived
its useful life and that the cost of repair was approximately
$150,000. Id. at 226; Ex. 41.

-5-

work had not yet been accomplished, Mr. Mortenson cavalierly
explained:
Q.

[by Mr. Carlston] Are there any major
expenses that you anticipate with respect to
the shopping center property?

A.

[by Mr. Mortenson]

Q.

Such as?

A.

Well, we had -- in 1988 in our budget we had
planned to put at least $30,000 in the
parking lot - in 89 we were going to put
$30,000 in the parking lot and we have been
unable to do so because of this lawsuit.

Q.

You've been unable to do so because of this
lawsuit?

A.

Would you put money in here if you was
threatened to lose the center?

Tr. 361, 1. 7-18.

Oh yes.

In other words, Manivest did not defer main-

tenance because it had not received adequate notice.

Manivest

refused to spend money on the improvements so that it could milk
every last dollar out of the shopping center until the date of
the trial.6
None of the authorities upon which Manivest relies suggests
that the Howes repeated notices were not sufficiently specific.
For example, in Hansen v. Christensen, 545 P.2d 1152 (Utah 1976)

6

For breach of the covenant to repair, the landlord may both
"terminate the lease and recover damages." Restatement § 13.1.
See Pinqree v. Continental Group of Utah, Inc., 558 P.2d 1317
(Utah 1976). The court's ruling on Manivest's Motion in Limine
kept out evidence of the amount of deferred maintenance and thus
precluded the Howes from receiving an award of substantial
additional damages.

-6-

the seller attempted to forfeit the buyer's rights under a real
estate sales contract even though "there was no contact or
communication between the parties", id. at 1153 (emphasis
added).

The buyer had absolutely no idea whether the seller

intended to waive the default, enforce it, or accept delayed
performance.

Ld. at 1154. Moreover, before receiving any demand

from the seller, the buyer had "made a tender of all sums due
under the contract."

id. at 1154 (emphasis added).

By contrast,

Manivest allowed two years to pass, knowing full well that the
Howes intended to enforce their rights under the Lease.
In Reeploeq v. Jensen, 490 P.2d 445 (Wash. Ct. App. 1971),
rev'd on other grounds 503 P.2d 99 (Wash. 1972) (en banc) cert.
den. 414 U.S. 839 (1973), the trial court forfeited the buyer's
interest under a real estate sales contract when the buyer failed
to make payments and to keep the improvements in good repair.
The seller gave written notice of default, but allowed the buyer
only 30 days to cure.

Within that time, the buyer tendered all

back payments but was unable to complete the repairs.
at 446.

490 P.2d

The trial court enforced the forfeiture despite proof

that the repairs could not have been economically performed
within 30 days, and that they were accomplished within a
reasonable period of time.

Id.

The Court of Appeals found that the seller's notice of
default failed to provide a reasonable cure period within which
the buyer could perform the repairs, id. at 447.

-7-

But the seller

alleged that the buyer's "full" payment was insufficient because
it did not include attorneys fees allegedly due.

The Court of

Appeals held that i_f a buyer has otherwise tendered satisfactory
performance, the seller can not forfeit the contract for having
failed to receive attorneys fees.

Id.

The Washington Supreme Court reversed the decision and
allowed the forfeiture to stand.

Although it reached this

decision on procedural grounds,7 the Supreme Court justified its
action by noting that the trial court "had considered the
relative equities" and that "[wjhile that court might have given
the [buyer] a period of grace," the trial court had correctly
"taken into account the apparent inability of the [buyer] to
perform her contractual obligation."

503 P.2d at 104. The Court

also justified the result based upon the "delays caused by the
[buyer], and the worry and expense of litigation to which the
[seller had] been subjected."

Ld.

Thus, the Washington Supreme

Court disagreed with the forfeiture analysis of the Court of
Appeals' decision upon which Manivest relies.

Indeed, the

Supreme Court decision in Reeploeq suggests that there is no

7

One panel of the Court of Appeals had previously dismissed
the buyer's appeal for lack of prosecution. On certiorari, the
Washington Supreme Court affirmed that decision. Later, another
panel of the Court of Appeals reinstated the appeal upon certain
conditions. The first panel then heard the appeal and reversed
the trial court decision. The Supreme Court concluded that one
appellate panel had no jurisdiction to overrule another, that the
dismissal of the appeal became final when the Supreme Court
affirmed it, and that all subsequent proceedings were void.

-8-

reason to set aside the forfeiture of the Lease because Manivest
did not take advantage of its opportunity to cure.
Tower v. Halderman, 782 P.2d 719 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1989) is
also inapplicable.

There the seller under a real estate contract

had alleged only two defaults in its notice of cancellation:

the

buyer's failure to remove certain contingencies and the buyer's
failure to approve a new loan.

At trial, under cross

examination, the seller conceded that the buyer had performed
both of these obligations before the seller sent the cancellation
notice.

The seller then argued that the contract was automatic-

ally terminated on the scheduled closing date.

The contract,

however, specifically required notice and gave the buyer 13 days
to cure the breach after the notice, id. at 720. Thus, the
notice itself recognized that the contract continued for an
additional 13 days.

Under these circumstances, the Halderman

court refused to allow the mere passing of the specified closing
date to be the basis for cancellation.

The Halderman court also

found evidence that the seller had acted in bad faith.

While

attempting to terminate the contract, the seller had "several
remaining tasks as seller, none of which he ever made any effort
to perform."

Id. at 722. Thus, the seller not only repudiated

the contract prematurely, but impeded the buyer's ability to
perform.
In this case, there was no evidence that the Howes had acted
in bad faith or impeded Manivestfs ability to perform.

-9-

Indeed,

Manivest failed to disclose the assignment to the liquidating
trust until just a few days before the trial8 and stalled the
Howe's efforts to perform an inspection.

Manivest thus kept the

Howes from being more specific in their demands. Moreover,
Manivest never did tender full performance.
Finally, Johnston v. Austin, 748 P.2d 1084 (Utah 1988) held
that "absent a contract provision to the contrary," the seller
may signal its intention to enforce its rights by initiating
legal action.

Td. at 1089. Certainly, the Howes1 lawsuit was

notice of the most unequivocal character that they intended to
exercise their rights under the Lease.

Manivest's failure to

have even explored the defaults alleged in the pleadings through
timely discovery does not allow it to ignore this "most solemn
form" of notice.

See Annot. 5 ALR2d 968, 975 (1949).

Not only did the Howes strictly comply with terms of the
Lease, they went well beyond its requirements.

Their method of

giving notice was reasonable, repetitive, specific and far more
generous than what was required by the Lease.
uncertainty as to their intent.

There was no

In such circumstances, Utah

courts have consistently recognized the landlord's right to
insist upon its contractual remedies, particularly when the
tenant has not taken advantage of a grace period.
Brief 45-46.

;

Tr. 97, 1. 5-8.

-10-

Howe's Opening

II. THE HOWES' EVIDENCE DID DEMONSTRATE THE CONDITION OF
THE IMPROVEMENTS BOTH BEFORE AND AFTER THE MARCH 1988 NOTICE.
Manivest argues that the Howes1 evidence "was irrelevant"
because it did not pertain to the condition of the property
"prior to May 31, 1988."

Reply Brief at 23. This argument was

not raised at trial, neither in the examination of the numerous
witnesses nor by way of objection to any of the exhibits.
Furthermore, it is unsupported by any authority, and it misstates
the evidence.
Although some of the proffered testimony related to the
dilapidated condition of the improvements in early 1990, this
condition did not arise overnight.

The Court received as

evidence photographs from early 1985 (Ex. 25), from mid-1985 (Ex.
26), and from March, May, June and July of 1988 (Ex. 28). These
photographs demonstrated that the parking lot had been sorely
neglected for some time and that it was already in terrible
condition when the Howes first gave notice of default.
Moreover, Manivest had remained in possession but had
performed no repairs to either the roof or parking lot since the
Howes first gave notice of default.

Surely, therefore, the

Howes' expert witnesses would have been competent to testify
about the condition of the parking lot and the roofs in 1988 and
the continued deterioration since that time.
658 P.2d 591 (Utah 1982).

Dixon v. Stewart,

The basis for their expert testimony

-11-

included personal inspections, historical records and
photographs, as well as their own specialized knowledge and
experience.

III. THE LEASE REQUIRED THE TENANT
TO CONSTRUCT THE SHOPPING CENTER IMPROVEMENTS.

Manivest argues that the Lease "did not require that the
shopping center be built but only gave the tenant the option to
do so."

Reply Brief at 23 (emphasis added).

To the contrary,

paragraphs 22 and 23 of the Lease specifically required the
tenant to construct a shopping center.

Those paragraphs read as

follows:
22. The Lessee covenants and agrees to commence
construction of the shopping center herein
contemplated within 4j5 days of the date of this
Agreement, and to thereafter diligently proceed
with the development and construction of said
shopping center.
23. Time is of the essence of this Agreement,
including the provisions of paragraph 22. Ex.1
(emphasis added).

IV.

THIS CASE DOES NOT INVOLVE "STRUCTURAL" REPAIRS.

Manivest attempts to characterize this as a case involving
"structural" repairs.

Reply Brief at 23.

It argues that even a

net lease does not bind a tenant to make structural repairs,
citing as its sole authority Mobil Oil Credit Corp. v. DST

-12-

Realty, Inc., 689 S.W.2d 658 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985).9

Neither the

record nor the authorities support this argument.
The obligation which the landlord sought to impose upon the
tenant in Mobil Oil is quite different from that which Manivest
agreed to undertake.

In Mobil Oil the landlord asked the tenant

to reconstruct a major portion of a multi-level parking structure
which already existed on the property when the lease commenced.
Id. at 659.

The court concluded that these repairs were

"structural" and that the parties had not addressed such
unforeseen repairs in the lease, id. at 661. The court
distinguished "ordinary repairs" - those "that are the result of
ordinary wear and tear on the lease property" - and recognized
these as the tenantf s obligation.

Id.

The Mobil Oil court

correctly distinguished between the tenant's duty to repair
ordinary wear and tear from the responsibility to provide massive
"structural" additions to a building which already existed when
the lease commenced.

Id. at 660-61.

9

Mobil Oil's relevance to the present dispute is tenuous, at
best. Mobil Oil did not hold that an agreement to "maintain"
premises only applies to the raw land - the critical issue in
this case. The Mobil Oil court merely held that when there "was
no provision for structural repairs," the "other portions of the
lease defining a 'net' lease ... cannot be used to create a
promise to make [structural] repairs." Idk at 660. The Mobil
Oil case, in which the lease was "silent as to who should pay,"
id., is of little relevance to the Howe Lease in which the tenant
agreed not only to construct all of the improvements but to "be
responsible for" and "maintain" the "entire demised premises."
Ex. 1 US.

-13-

When a defective condition has been caused by normal weather
conditions and aging over a period of years, the repairs do not
thereby become structural or extraordinary so as to relieve the
tenant of responsibility.

Thomas W. Garland, Inc. v. Rubin, 493

S.W.2d 74, 76 (Miss. Ct. App. 1973).

The obvious need regularly

to resurface a flat asphalt roof or to maintain an asphalt
parking lot, does not turn these into structural repairs just
because they are deferred.

Indeed, when Manivest filed its real

property tax appeal in 1989, Manivest acknowledged that
"considerable deferred maintenance [had] accumulated."
(Letter dated August 15, 1989).

Ex. 29

This resulted from normal

weather conditions and aging over a period of years, without
routine maintenance.

Thus, the Howes did not demand that

Manivest make "structural" repairs.

V. THIS CASE INVOLVES A "LONG TERM" NET LEASE.
On page 24 of its Reply Brief, Manivest represents that the
ten year lease in Mobil Oil was a "long term" lease.

But the

Missouri Court of Appeals has actually distinguished Mobil Oil as
a "short-term" lease case.

Washington University v. Royal Crown

Bottling Co., 801 S.W.2d 458, 465-6 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990).

In

Washington University, the court said that Mobil Oil did not
establish a "broad rule which can be extended to the very

-14-

different circumstances presented by long-term net leases."

Id.

at 465.
Washington University involved a 25-year lease of commercial
property which required the tenant to improve and modernize one
existing building, demolish another and construct a new building.
Thus, like Manivest, the tenant was required substantially to
improve the premises.

Moreover, as in the present case, the rent

was fixed, the tenant bore the cost of all casualty and liability
insurance, and the tenant had a right to purchase the property.
Furthermore, in the past the tenant had accepted responsibility
for repairs, as did Manivest.

Tr. 84, 1. 17-24; id., at 315, 1.

22-25; Ex. 27, 29, 43 and 45.
The Washington University court concluded that the tenant
was required to bear "all costs of repairs and maintenance" for
all of the improvements, "including the cost of structural
repairs."

801 S.W.2d at 466.

It did so based on the length of

the term, the opportunity for the tenant to amortize repair
costs, and the fact that the lease was a net lease.10

10

The court quoted and relied upon Professor Friedman's
explanation of a net lease, which is recited on page 54 of the
Howes' Opening Brief. id. at 466.

-15-

VI.

THE TERM "DEMISED PREMISES"
INCLUDES THE IMPROVEMENTS.

The Washington University case is consistent with other
decisions which have considered the meaning of the term "demised
premises."

Such courts have repeatedly recognized that the term

must be considered in the context of the entire lease.
For example in Trust Company of Georgia v. S. & W.
Cafeteria, 103 S.E.2d 63, (Ga. Ct. App. 1958) the court found
that the word "premises" could have different meanings in
different contexts but that in this case it clearly meant the
land, the buildings and the tenant's leasehold estate.
72.

Id.

at

The court said:
[T]he definition is not inflexible and [the] word must
be construed in accordance with its context. As a
matter of course the word must be given meaning in
harmony with the other provisions of the contract in
which it is contained so as to give reasonable and
rationale import to the whole instrument. 3ji. at 71.
When the narrow question is whether buildings are included,

it is generally held that the word "premises" means both the land
and the buildings thereon.

Bachenheimer v. Palm Springs

Management Corp., 254 P.2d 153, 157 (Cal. Ct. App. 1953).
In Benenson v. Ritzman, 108 N.Y.Supp.2d 521 (N.Y. S.Ct.
1951) the court rejected the tenant's demand that at the end of
the lease the tenant be compensated for the buildings.
explained its reasoning as follows:
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The court

A lease of land carries with it the building erected on
the land. The general maxim of the law is that whatever is fixed to the realty becomes a part of it, and
partakes of all of its incidents and properties. This
is the rule, even in the relationship of landlord and
tenant. Icl. at 527 (citations omitted, emphasis
added).
There, as here, the buildings did not exist when the lease
commenced.

They were erected by a tenant pursuant to the

original lease, which had been assigned, renewed and continued
for several years.
In an "entirely net lease", it is appropriate that the
maintenance obligation include the buildings and the parking lot
rather than merely the land.

In its ordinary sense, the word

"maintain" means "to hold or keep in any particular state or
condition."

Webster's New International Dictionary (2d Ed.).

Thus, if it applies only to raw land, the covenant "to maintain"
would preclude development; it would be directly contrary to the
obligation to construct the shopping center improvements on the
land.

If it applies to the improvements, however, it is

consistent with the tenant's obligation to construct the shopping
center and to not allow any violations of government ordinances
or regulations.

Ex. 1 MI5, 22. n

n

Manivest suggests that it had full discretion regarding
maintenance because the Howes' possessory interest in the
structures did not come into fruition until some years later.
But the Howes' reversionary interest was a present, marketable
interest. Its value was directly affected by both the present
and the projected future condition of the improvements. The
Howes thus had a strong interest in assuring that the
improvements were maintained properly.
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CONCLUSION
During this dispute, Manivest and its affiliates transferred all of their assets to the Manivest Liquidating Trust.
Ex. 40. Therefore, the Howes now have faced up to the fact that
an award of damages for Manivest's failure to maintain the
improvements would be a Pyrrhic victory —

a mere invitation to

another collection lawsuit for additional damages against an
already insolvent trust. Jd.

For that reason, and in the

interests of judicial economy, the Howes have agreed that if the
court affirms the trial court's decision to forfeit the Lease,
the case need not be remanded to the trial court for further
action on the covenant to maintain.
In the event, however, that the court were to reverse
the forfeiture, the Howes respectfully submit that the trial
court's decision on Manivest's Motion in Limine should be
reversed,,

The Howes should be entitled to proceed with their

claims that Manivest breached its obligation to "be responsible
for" and to "maintain" the improvements.

In retrospect, it is

clear that the trial court erred when it prematurely construed the
maintenance language of paragraph 5 to apply only to the land.

DATED this /7 day of September, 1991.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
Bv

U

L^JL Q

<1~1£-^

Michael R. Carlston
Max D. Wheeler
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 19th day of September, 1991, I
caused the original and nine true and correct copies of the
foregoing REPLY BRIEF OF CROSS-APPELLANTS to be hand-delivered to
the Utah Supreme Court and four true and correct copies to be
mailed, first class, postage prepaid, to:
Ronald E. Nehring, Esq,
James A. Boevers, Esq.
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER
175 East Fourth South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Michael R. Carlston

Exhibit 8

PROFESSIONAL MANIVEST, INC. PEAL ESTATE MANAGEMENT 5 !N\'ESTMFN~
January 22, 1988

Mr. and Mrs. Gerrit M. Steenblik
5501 East Camelhill Road
Phoenix, Arizona 85018
Dear Mr. and Mrs. Steenblik:
Recently, we completed a loan transaction with Valley Bank;
and in doing so, they have taken an assignment of our leasehold
interest at the South Lake Shopping Center.
We are enclosing two copies of the Assignment of Lease
which has been executed by us and by the lender. Attached to this
assignment is an acknowledgement which we would like signed. Would
you please sign where your names appear, have your signatures notarized, and return one copy to us in the enclosed self-addressed
envelope.
Thank you for your help. The second copy of the assignment is for your file.
Sincerely,

r
Larry K-\ Leeper
Vice President
LKL/st
Enclosures
cc:

John Howe

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF ASSIGNMENT
ROBERT E. HOWE, BONNIE F. HOWE, WILLIAM K. EVANS, CAROL H. EVANS,
JOHN 0. HOWE, MAXINE HOWE, GERRIT M. STEENBLIK, and JUDITH H. STEENBLIK,
Lessors under the Lease described in the above and foregoing Assignment,
hereby acknowledge the Assignment of Lease between Borrower and Bank and
agree to give Bank fifteen (15) days notice of any claim or default against
the Borrower under the above-described Lease and to allow Bank the opportunity to correct any such default within such period.
The undersigned acknowledges that the Lessee is encumbering their
interest in the property and said loan is hereby approved as required by
said lease.
The undersigned Lessors agree not to change or modify the terms of
the above-described lease without notice to Bank.
The Lessors acknowledge that the Lease is in full force and effect
and the Borrower is not in default.
Lessors acknowledge that Bank shall have no present obligation
under the Lease and that Lessors shall look solely to Borrower for performance, subject to Bank's right to cure any default following written
notice.
The foregoing Assignment and this Acknowledgement shall continue
in full force and effect until written instructions to the contrary are
received from Bank.

All notices and demands made to the Lessors shall be

in writing and shall be delivered personally or sent by first class mail,
postage pre-paid, addressed to Lessors at the address set forth below.
DATED as of this

day of January, 1988.

LESSORS:

ROBERT E. HOWE

BONNIE F. HOWE
WILLIAM K. EVANS
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CAROL H. EVANS

JOHN 0. HOWE

MAXINE HOWE

GERRIT M. STEENBLIK

JUDITH H. STEENBLIK
Address for notice purposes:
Valley Bank and Trust
80 West Broadway 7/330
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)
: ss.
)

On this
day of January, 1988, personally appeared before
me, ROBERT E. HOWE, the signer of the above instrument who duly acknowledged to me that he executed the same.
My Commission Expires:
NOTARY PUBLIC
Residing at:
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STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)
: ss.
)

On this
day of January, 1988, personally appeared before
me, BONNIE F. HOWE, the signer of the above instrument who duly acknowledged to me that she executed the same.
My Commission Expires:
NOTARY PUBLIC
Residing at:
STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)
: ss.
)

On this
day of January, 1988, personally appeared before
me, WILLIAM K« EVANS, the signer of the above instrument who duly acknowledged to me that he executed the same.
My Commission Expires:
NOTARY PUBLIC
Residing at:
STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)
: ss
j

On this
day of January, 1988, personally appeared before
me, CAROL H. EVANS, the signer of the above instrument who duly acknowledged to me that she executed the same.
My Commission Expires:
NOTARY PUBLIC
Residing at:
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STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)
: ss.
)

On this
day of January, 1988, personally appeared before
me, JOHN 0. HOWE, the signer of the above instrument who duly acknowledged
to me that he executed the same.
My Commission Expires:

m

NOTARY PUBLIC
Residing at:
STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)
: ss.
)

On this
day of January, 1988, personally appeared before
me, MAXINE HOWE, the signer of the above instrument who duly acknowledged
to me that she executed the same.
My Commission Expires:
NOTARY PUBLIC
Residing at:
STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)
: ss.
)

On this
day of January, 1988, personally appeared before
me, GERRIT M. STEENBLIK, the signer of the above instrument who duly
acknowledged to me that he executed the same.
My Commission Expires:
NOTARY PUBLIC
Residing at:
STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)
: ss.
)

On this
day of January, 1988, personally appeared before
me, JUDITH H. STEENBLIK, the signer of the above instrument who duly
acknowledged to me that she executed the same.
My Commission Expires:
NOTARY PUBLIC
-7- Residing at:

